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 The Drink You Have When You ’ re Not 
Having a Drink 
 ROBERT A.  WILSON 
 Abstract :  The Architecture of the Mind  is itself built on foundations that deserve probing. 
In this brief commentary I focus on these foundations — Carruthers ’ conception of 
modularity, his arguments for thinking that the mind is massively modular in structure, 
and his view of human cognitive architecture. 
 Peter Carruthers ’  The Architecture of the Mind  is a wide-ranging book that offers an 
articulation and defense of the idea that  ‘ the mind ’ — in particular, the human 
mind — has a massively modular architecture. In this brief commentary I focus on 
Carruthers ’ starting points — his conception of modularity, his arguments for 
thinking that the mind is massively modular in structure, and his view of human 
cognitive architecture. 
 
 1. What is Modularity? 
 Carruthers acknowledges that there are many conceptions of modularity in the 
literature, and he avoids being dogmatic about just what modularity must be. 
Recall that  Fodor (1983) listed nine features of modules: they are domain speciﬁ c, 
mandatory, operant on inputs inaccessible to downstream processing, fast, 
informationally encapsulated, producers of outputs that are conceptually shallow, 
associated with ﬁ xed neural architecture, subject to patterned breakdowns, and 
ontogenetically sequenced/innate. Fodor also claimed (and still claims) that only 
the perceptual systems  plus language  are modular. Since Carruthers aims to 
articulate a notion of modularity that  ‘ makes the best sense of the claims of 
massive modularists ’ (p. 8), where these are claims that the  whole or most  of our 
cognitive architecture is modular, he rejects this notion of a module, which he 
calls a  Fodor-module . In particular, according to Carruthers, in order to give a 
charitable reading to the claims of massive modularists, speed, shallowness, innate 
channeling, and encapsulation need to be dropped from the list of properties that 
modules have, 
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 … leav[ing] us with the idea that modules might be isolable function-
speciﬁ c processing systems, all or almost all of which are domain speciﬁ c 
 … , whose operations aren ’ t subject to the will, which are associated with 
speciﬁ c neural structures (albeit sometimes spatially dispersed ones), and 
whose internal operations may be inaccessible to the remainder of cognition 
(p. 12). 
 So what we might call  Carruthers-modules  are domain speciﬁ c, mandatory, associated 
with speciﬁ c neural structures, and processing inaccessible. Roughly speaking, 
these are the ﬁ rst three of Fodor ’ s conditions, plus his seventh, ﬁ xed neural 
structures. Three points about  Carruthers-modularity . 
 First, while Carruthers clearly intends this as a loosening of the notion of 
Fodor-modularity, retaining some but not all of the properties that Fodor ascribes 
to modules, the method of argument used to arrive at Carruthers-modularity is 
problematic. The grounds for rejecting some of the properties that Fodor cites —
 such as conceptual shallowness and  perhaps  informational encapsulation — are that 
they are  incompatible  with the claim that all or most of cognition is modular. Fair 
enough. But the grounds for rejecting other properties — fast, ontologically 
sequencing/innate, and  perhaps  informational encapsulation — is that  it is possible 
that  processes like reasoning and remembering might not have, or are unlikely to 
have, these features. This is a kind of lowest common denominator reasoning 
that spells trouble. In fact, it constitutes a reason for rejecting  all  of the properties 
on Fodor ’ s list, even domain-speciﬁ city, as Carruthers himself seems to 
acknowledge (pp. 8–9). This would leave us with a notion of modularity that 
might perhaps best be called — paying homage to an advertising campaign popular 
in Australia for non-alcoholic beverages in the 1980s that played on the word 
 ‘ drink ’ — Clayton ’ s modularity : the modularity you have when you ’ re not having 
any modularity. 
 Carruthers will surely resist the charge that his softening of Fodor-modularity 
amounts to Clayton ’ s modularity, but some of his early comments in the book 
stiffen the challenge here. He begins by introducing a very weak sense of  ‘ module ’ 
according to which a module is  ‘ a dissociable functional component ’ (p. 2), saying 
that the massive modularists  ‘ are defending a thesis of considerable interest, even if 
 “ module ” just  means  “ component ” ’ (p. 3). While Carruthers is no doubt correct to 
imply that sometimes evolutionary psychologists and others think of modules in 
this minimal way, it muddies the waters considerably to keep the notion of 
modularity  this  open in making sense of the claim that the mind is  ‘ massively 
modular ’ .  ‘ Component ’ , after all, and even  ‘ dissociable functional component ’ , are 
not much different from  ‘ faculty ’ or  ‘ part ’ , and any modularity thesis worth its salt 
has to say something more than that the mind is built up out of lots and lots of 
components, faculties, or parts. 
 Second, consider the post-Fodorian deployment of the concept of modularity, 
most notably in the hands of developmental psychologists and evolutionary 
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psychologists, which has pursued modularity in recesses into which, Fodor himself 
claimed, no self-respecting cognitive scientist should venture. Like Fodor, these 
enthusiasts of modularity are often less than fully forthcoming about precisely 
what properties modules have. And like Fodor, they are right not to get too hung 
up on this, making hay while the sun shines. But in self-consciously ﬂ outing 
Fodor ’ s First Law for the Non-Existence of Cognitive Science — the more  ‘ central ’ 
(code words: Quinean and isotropic) a process is, the less anyone understands 
it — they are working with something like  Fodor-modules . When Dan  Sperber 
(1994) argues that there is no barrier to extending the notion of modularity to the 
 conceptual  realm, it was  Fodor modules  whose extension he was increasing, not 
some signiﬁ cantly more anemic notion of a module (see  Hirschfeld and Gelman, 
1994 more generally). Sperber argues that Fodor is mistaken in thinking that 
modules  in something close to Fodor ’ s own sense of modularity  can ’ t be conceptual (and 
can ’ t in turn shape cultural representations). When Leda  Cosmides (1989) argues 
for the existence of a  social exchange module  that underlies performance on the 
various permutations on the Wason reasoning tasks, again these are modules in 
 something close to Fodor ’ s own sense of modularity . In particular, both  domain-speciﬁ city 
 and  informational encapsulation  are not only features of these early contestations 
of Fodor ’ s pessimism about the reach of modularity and the corresponding 
limitations of cognitive science; they are important in steering clear of Clayton ’ s 
modularity. 
 My ﬁ nal point here picks up on the charge that Carruthers sails dangerously 
close to Clayton ’ s modularity. In anticipation of something like this objection, 
Carruthers makes two pre-emptive moves. The ﬁ rst is to suggest that it doesn ’ t 
really matter whether we accept Carruthers-modularity as a form of modularity: 
what matters are the substantive proposals about animal and human cognitive 
architecture, whatever we call them. It is true that the speciﬁ c proposals concerning 
human cognitive architecture made in the second half of the book are worth 
considering, whether or not their components are called  ‘ modules ’ . But since 
Carruthers himself invokes a very general notion of a module (= component) and 
a more speciﬁ c notion (= loosening from Fodor-modules), casting the book in 
terms of modularity while divesting oneself of commitment regarding precisely 
which notion of modularity is in play is trying to have your cake and eat it too. 
The book is, after all, a defense of the  massive modularity thesis , with speciﬁ c 
proposals about what the resulting modules look like. 
 The second move is to point to appeals to modularity beyond the domain of 
cognition — those in play in discussions of hierarchically-ordered, complex systems 
à la Herb Simon, and those in play in discussions of modularity in evolutionary 
developmental biology à la Gunther Wagner. These are powerful appeals, and 
they provide motivation for the massive modularity thesis independent of the idea 
of extending Fodor-modularity to  ‘ central systems ’ . The primary arguments that 
Carruthers offers for the massive modularity thesis appeal to these  ‘ beyond-
cognition ’ considerations in favor of modularity. The resulting arguments are our 
next topics. 
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 2. The Argument from Design 
 The ﬁ rst of these arguments is neatly summarized (p. 25) as follows: 
 (1)  Biological systems are designed systems, constructed incrementally. 
 (2)  Such systems, when complex, need to have massively modular 
organization. 
 (3)  The human mind is a biological system, and is complex. 
 (4)  So the human mind will be massively modular in its organization. 
 The design in (1) is due to evolution by natural selection. The Argument from 
Design is intended to be quite general in its scope, however, and there are sources 
of design other than natural selection, as Carruthers makes clear. Thus, a version 
of this argument can be run with  ‘ computational system(s) ’ substituted for 
 ‘ biological system(s) ’ throughout. Carruthers takes Herb  Simon (1962) to have 
made this argument in both forms. 
 As general as the Argument from Design is, formally similar arguments cast in 
terms of  physical  systems or  social  systems lack even the  prima facie  plausibility that 
the Argument from Design has. Their failures are instructive. The corresponding 
 Argument from Physical Design  is: 
 (1 ’ )  Physical  systems are designed systems, constructed incrementally. 
 (2 ’ )  Such systems, when complex, need to have massively modular 
organization. 
 (3 ’ )  The human mind is a physical system, and is complex. 
 (4)  So the human mind will be massively modular in its organization. 
 Despite the truth of (3 ’ ), since physical systems in general are not designed, (1 ’ ) is 
false and so (2 ’ ) moot. Consider now the corresponding  Argument from Social Design : 
 (1*)  Social  systems are designed systems, constructed incrementally. 
 (2*)  Such systems, when complex, need to have massively modular 
organization. 
 (3*)  The human mind is a social system, and is complex. 
 (4)  So the human mind will be massively modular in its organization. 
 Put the apparent falsity of (3*) to one side for now, and concentrate on (1*) and 
(2*). Although  some  social systems are designed and constructed incrementally —
 particularly those that are  institution-based  or  institution-focused — this is not true 
 in general  of social systems, and so (1*) is not true in general. Moreover, it is unclear 
just what (2*) is claiming about the organization of those social systems that 
 are  modular. What does it mean for a  social system  to be modular? 
 Return to the original Argument from Design. The Argument from  Physical 
 Design tells us that (3 ’ ) is true but irrelevant, and it suggests that the appeal to 
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complexity in (3) in the original argument does not carry much weight: it is the 
appeal  to design  in (1) that matters. The Argument from  Social  Design tells us that, 
the contestability of (3*) to one side, even supposing that the mind  were  a social 
system of some kind leaves open the question as to whether it is a  designed social 
system  and just what modularity amounts to for such systems. It suggests that either 
(1) in the Argument from Design needs to be read as making a  universal  claim 
about biological systems, or that (3) in that argument needs to say that the human 
mind is a  designed biological system . Both claims are problematic. 
 Suppose that, as I have argued elsewhere (e.g.  Wilson, 2004, 2005 ) some 
biological and cognitive systems are  extended  in the sense articulated by Andy Clark 
and Dave Chalmers in defending the  extended mind thesis  and speciﬁ ed in an earlier 
defense of  wide computationalism  ( Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Wilson, 1994 ). Both 
(1) and (3) remain true when we consider such extended cognitive systems. But 
what of (2)? Do (complex) extended biological and cognitive systems need to have 
massively modular organization? Although Carruthers himself is not very 
sympathetic to the extended mind thesis, this is a question about his views — what 
they allow and what they entail — not his sympathies. Consider two ways to 
conceptualize the massively modular organization of extended biological and 
cognitive systems. 
 The ﬁ rst is to conceptualize the system as having some of its modules existing 
completely beyond the boundary of the organism, such that even though many 
modules are organism-bound, this is not true of the overall biological/cognitive 
system of the organism. Certainly some biological systems are like this, such as what 
Scott  Turner (2000) calls the  extended physiology  of coral reefs and termite mounds. 
The second is to conceptualize the modules themselves, and not just the system that 
they constitute, as extending beyond the boundary of the organism. I have argued 
that this is true of visual modules, such as those posited in the multiple spatial channels 
theory of form perception ( Wilson, 1994, 1995 , ch. 3), and that there are general 
reasons to expect vision to engage in what I call  exploitative representation , a type of 
representation that incorporates worldly elements rather than constructing costly 
internal codes or images ( Wilson, 2005 , ch. 8; see also  Shapiro, 1997 ). 
 Here is one place where precisely what a module and massive modular organization 
are make a difference to the plausibility of the views that one is committed to. For 
if a module is simply a component, and so to have massively modular organization 
is simply to have lots of components, then it is difﬁ cult to see why  ‘ going extended ’ 
 in either of these two ways  would make a difference to (2) in the Argument from 
Design. The same holds true for  functionally speciﬁ ed component , or even, I think, for 
 Carruthers-module . Strengthening the requirements for modularity puts more pressure 
on (2), however, insofar as extended modularity in  that  sense (e.g. Fodor-modularity) 
becomes harder to make sense of, much as (I suggested in passing) making sense of 
the massive modularity of  socially  designed systems requires additional clariﬁ catory 
work. My own view is that one  can not only make sense of extended Fodor-
modules, but that we have lots and lots of these; but I suspect that this is an 
option that Carruthers himself would be, at best, uncomfortable with endorsing. 
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 3. The Argument from Animals 
 Unlike the Argument from Design, which Carruthers clearly articulates, the other 
chief argument for the massive modularity thesis, his Argument from Animals, is 
never explicitly stated in the book, despite being the subject of discussion for about 
100 pages. Here ’ s one stab at specifying the argument: 
 (i)  Animal minds are massively modular 
 (ii)  Human minds are incremental extensions of animal minds 
 (iii)  So human minds are massively modular. 
 All but one paragraph of Chapter 2,  ‘ The Architecture of Animal Minds ’ , is 
devoted to defending Premise (i). That remaining paragraph, the ﬁ nal one in the 
long chapter, starts: 
 Given that animal minds are organized along massively modular lines, then 
normal biological reasoning should lead us to expect that massively modular 
architectures will be preserved in the minds of members of  Homo sapiens , too. 
And now we have some speciﬁ c suggestions about what that core architecture 
should look like  … together with a range of likely belief-generating and 
desire-generating modules contained in it  … (p. 149). 
 I take this to provide the reasoning behind (ii), and Chapter 3 to ﬂ esh out the kind 
of incremental extensions of animal minds that Carruthers thinks we possess in our 
own minds. 
 The formal invalidity of the Argument from Animals, at least as I have 
reconstructed it above, does not detract from its interest. In chapter 2 Carruthers 
introduces the following claims as part of his defense of (i): 
 •  perception/belief/desire/planning cognitive architectures can be found in 
creatures as phylogenetically separated from  Homo sapiens  as insects are 
(section 1); 
 •  the ventral/dorsal visual systems — commonly referred to as the  what/
where systems — exemplify massively modular design (section 2); 
 •  there are a variety of distinct belief-generating systems in animals, including 
those for spatial navigation, for the representation of time, number, and 
space, for causation, and for social cognition (section 3); 
 •  emotional and social motivational modules structure desire (section 5); 
 •  the multiple memory systems that are widely recognized exemplify 
modular organization (section 6). 
 The ﬁ rst point about these claims is that they provide instances of massively 
modular organization only given a relatively weak understanding of what modules 
are, an understanding weaker than that of Carruthers-modules, for example. There 
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is a lot of organization to the mind, but the massive modularity hypothesis says 
something speciﬁ c about the nature of that organization: minimally (I think), that 
it is relatively  domain-speciﬁ c  and relatively  informationally encapsulated . It is striking 
that almost none of the work that Carruthers draws on here (Gallistel ’ s on animal 
navigation is the exception) has been presented in support of even moderately 
strong modularity theses by those who have developed the work. The discussion 
of the what/where system, for example, is focused on articulating the boundaries 
for these two systems, debating how best to think of the distinction (what versus 
where, what versus how), and strengthening the evidence for a double-dissociation 
between the two systems.  Very little of this tells us about many of the properties that 
characterize Fodor-modules or even Carruthers-modules . The same is true of the putative 
belief-generating modules, and in general of the multiple memory systems (working 
versus long-term, episodic versus semantic, explicit versus implicit), even if there 
are some interesting domain-speciﬁ c phenomena associated with each. 
 The second point concerns the subjects of this research. Putting aside claims 
about invertebrate belief-desire-planning architectures, most of this work has been 
reported in a relatively narrow phylogenetic range of the animal kingdom — roughly, 
from rats to primates — and some of that which Carruthers relies on has been 
found  primarily  in human populations (note that such data can ’ t be used directly to 
support (i)). The ﬁ rst of these points suggests that perhaps (i) should read: 
 (i+)  Advanced animal minds are massively modular, 
or perhaps, 
 (i#)  Animal minds that are phylogenetically close to our own are massively 
modular, 
and I wonder whether Carruthers would accept either of these as friendly 
amendments to the Argument from Animal Minds as I have presented it. 
 Suppose that we accept that animal minds are massively modular. What about 
(ii), the claim that human minds are incremental extensions of animal minds, and 
the inference from (i) and (ii) to the massive modularity thesis about human minds? 
The inference assumes that massive modularity is a property conserved across 
incremental extension. There are two questions to ask about this: Is massive 
modularity conserved across a single incremental extension? Is the conservation of 
massive modularity transitive? 
 The answer to the ﬁ rst question is  ‘ yes ’ : once you have massive modularity you 
can ’ t lose it in a single incremental extension. But the answer to the second question 
is  ‘ no ’ , since otherwise this would imply that massive modularity  could never  be lost 
through a series of incremental extensions, and that is obviously false:  any  phenotypic 
feature can be so lost. (Carruthers seems to overlook this point, as do proponents of 
intelligent design who appeal to properties like  ‘ irreducible complexity ’ .) In thinking 
about the relationship between animal and human minds it is this second question 
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that is most relevant, since current animal and human minds are separated by at least 
5 million years of evolutionary and other changes. So there are likely  many  incremental 
changes separating us from our animal ancestors. Whether any one of these makes 
the resulting mind more or less modular is an open question. These facts suggest that 
(i) and (ii) do not provide very strong support for (iii). 
 4. The Modularity of the Human Mind 
 On pp. 154-157, Carruthers provides us with a list of 22 mental capacities that are 
candidates for what makes human cognition distinct. To give the ﬂ avor of the list, 
a representative sampling: 
 1.  A folk-physics capacity, enabling deeper causal reasoning about physical 
phenomenon than may be available to chimpanzees  … 
 2.  A folk-biology capacity, involving a weak form of biological essentialism 
and also enabling  ‘ deeper ’ causal reasoning and inductive generalizations 
concerning living organisms. 
 3.  A mindreading capacity, enabling us to attribute mental states to other 
people, and to predict their likely actions in the light of their beliefs and 
goals  … 
 13.  A sense of humor, and a disposition to tease, to tell jokes, and to play 
tricks. 
 14.  An interest in stories, and a disposition to invent and transmit such 
stories. 
 15.  A capacity for music; a sense of rhythm; and a disposition to dance and 
to sing. 
 20.  A capacity to make inferences to the best explanation in general, and to 
reason scientiﬁ cally, in particular  … 
 21.  An indeﬁ nitely ﬂ exible capacity for practical reasoning  … 
 22.  A capacity, not just to reason theoretically and practically in intelligent 
and ﬂ exible ways, but also to reﬂ ect upon, and to modify, one ’ s own 
reasoning practices  … . 
 These triads of capacities are importantly different from one another vis-à-vis the 
overall project of the book. 
 The ﬁ rst three capacities have been prominent in cognitive developmental 
psychology over the past 20 years, and it is here that the contestable language of 
modularity is most at home, even if there remain ongoing debates about  the 
modularity  of folk physics, biology, and psychology. I shall have more to say about 
these in concluding. 
 The next three capacities have not been seriously treated  as modules  in the 
cognitive science literature. I suspect that this is why Carruthers provides neither 
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any references for work on these nor takes them up in the remainder of the book. 
They have the feel of being more at home in an early 19 th century tract on 
phrenology, an early 20 th century pamphlet on eugenics, or the most intellectually 
crass forms of pop sociobiology, than in a serious work on the cognitive architecture 
of the human mind. There is no reason to credibly posit such widely shared 
psychological tendencies  as parts of the human cognitive architecture , let alone as  modular 
 parts of a massively modular architecture. 
 The ﬁ nal three capacities identify putative aspects of human reasoning and 
inference, and each is the subject of more sustained discussion in the second half 
of the book. Carruthers ’ discussions here lead him to consider ways in which 
inferential processing can be modiﬁ ed and restructured in light of an organism ’ s 
experience, as well as quite radical ways in which social contexts, informational 
tools and techniques, and instruction contribute to the augmentation of cognitive 
processing in the domains of inference. Where I would see these as restructuring 
the architecture of cognition itself, Carruthers sees phenomena such as the rise of 
explicit scientiﬁ c methodologies and rule systems governing both deductive and 
inductive reasoning as providing epistemic clues about the  internal  massively 
modular architecture that underpins science and reasoning. 
 I close by returning to the putative  ‘ folk modules ’ of physics, biology, and 
psychology. When Carruthers discusses these in more detail (pp. 166-186), he 
tends to view debate over them as internal to those who are committed to some 
version of the massive modularity thesis, a tendency underwritten by his earlier 
weakening of the concept of modularity. By contrast, I think that much of the 
debate here, especially in the last 10 years, is over the appropriateness of viewing 
the corresponding cognitive architecture in those terms. Consider two examples. 
 Frank Keil ’ s early work on the development of biological knowledge (e.g.  Keil, 
1989 ) is often viewed as providing evidence for a distinct folk biological module —
 that is, one distinct from  and not derivative from  a folk psychological module,  contra 
 Susan  Carey ’ s (1985) landmark work on conceptual development. However, Keil ’ s 
more recent work is much more skeptical about the  ‘ folk biology module ’ construal 
of his ﬁ ndings, appealing as it does to what he calls  modes of construal  and focusing 
on ways in which views of individuals as bearing rich, internal biological knowledge 
are misleading (e.g.  Keil, 1994 ;  Wilson and Keil, 1998;  Rozenblit and Keil, 2002; 
Lutz and Keil, 2000 ). I read Keil as now  rejecting  the rush to think of cognitive 
development in terms of the triggering or unfolding of a relatively small number 
of distinct modules of domain-speciﬁ c knowledge, at least if folk biology is meant 
to be one such module. 
 The literature on folk psychology, to which Carruthers devotes more discussion, 
especially to the model of folk psychology defended by Shaun  Nichols and Steve 
Stich (2003) , should be seen in much the same way. Carruthers views Nichols and 
Stich as proposing a cognitive architecture for mindreading that exempliﬁ es part of 
our massively modular architecture, quickly dismissing their own distancing of 
their view from the language of modularity by attributing this to their own focus 
on Fodor-modules (p. 174). This allows Carruthers to skate over the difference 
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between providing a  model  of mindreading and postulating a  module  for mindreading. 
But this is not only to miss the nuances of Nichols and Stich ’ s own discussion (see 
especially their pp. 131-49, and pp. 200-13), but to ignore the larger, ongoing 
debate over how to conceptualize mindreading and  ‘ folk psychology ’ . (For two 
recent examples, see  Melser, 2004 and  Ratcliffe, 2006 .) Perhaps Carruthers thinks 
that those, such as Melser and Ratcliffe, who dissent from the modularity-broadly-
construed view of mindreading are not worth taking seriously. But surely at least 
Nichols and Stich are not in this category, and their overall account challenges the 
claim that mindreading is a  Carruthers-module . As they say in summarizing their 
view, on their account: 
 … mindreading depends on a motley array of mechanisms. Some aspects of 
mindreading are best explained by appeal to an information-rich theory, while 
other mindreading abilities are best explained by simulation, and still others 
are explained by processes like default attribution, which are not comfortably 
classiﬁ ed as either theory driven or simulation based (p. 212). 
 Carruthers may well take Nichols and Stich to be positing lots of  components  that 
underwrite our mindreading capacities, but it is only confusing, in my view, to 
lump this together with the claim that their work supports the massive modularity 
hypothesis. 
 5. Conclusion 
 To sum up, in brief: I have suggested that while the early, non-dogmatic discussion 
of the concept of modularity is a welcome, refreshing feature of Carruthers ’ 
approach to the massive modularity thesis, the outcome of that discussion has left 
less welcome stains on his overall view of cognitive architecture. Whether this, in 
turn, suggests that the book has a less modular design than Carruthers himself 
implies in his preface (p. xi), I leave as a question for further discussion. 
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